[29th post in 'Ensuring a Learning India' series. 42 in total. One post per day. 13 more to go.]
The previous section discussed problems of public school teachers as perceived by them. Teacher incentives is one of the most cited solution to improve the quality of teaching in public schools. This section discusses three broad categories of such incentives. While a completely literature review of various forms of incentives is beyond the scope of this section, some important studies are highlighted.
The previous section discussed problems of public school teachers as perceived by them. Teacher incentives is one of the most cited solution to improve the quality of teaching in public schools. This section discusses three broad categories of such incentives. While a completely literature review of various forms of incentives is beyond the scope of this section, some important studies are highlighted.
I. Monetary incentives
There are broadly four types of
monetary incentives discussed in the context of school teachers.
1. Teacher pay: One of the
most cited causes for the poor quality of public schools is the low teacher pay,
and hence the recommendations to pay good salaries. Some people often suggest
the large scale recruitment of low-salaried contract teachers, which led to
overall teacher quality.
Evidence doesn’t seem to support
these claims. One, regular teachers in public schools are paid as per the 6th
pay commission (and 7th pay commission if it comes out) and are not
low as generally perceived. Two, as discussed in the section on ‘Four not-so
critical constraints’, large scale evaluation of the contract teachers in
Andhra Pradesh suggests that contract teachers who receive a fraction of
salary, are no worse than regular public school teachers. If salary was the
main constraint, then the regular teachers would have been out-performing the
low salaried teachers. While there is a risk to extrapolating this evidence to
other contexts in India, this at least shows that the widely held belief needn’t
necessarily be true in some contexts. Similar studies in other countries also
suggest that, merely increasing teachers’ pay doesn’t lead to outcomes.
This doesn’t mean that teachers
shouldn’t be paid good salaries. They can be paid as the resources may allow
but citing this as the main reason, prioritizing it over everything else, and giving
disproportionate space in the scarce discourse bandwidth, may not be the wise
thing to do.
2. Pay for performance: Under
this, teachers are paid incentives as per the improvement of test scores of the
children they taught. There is good amount of literature on this aspect but the
one conducted in India may be particularly relevant.
Karthik Muralidharan and
Sundararaman conducted a large scale randomized evaluation of ‘pay for
performance’ incentives in Andhra Pradesh. This study is an important not just because
of its scale and it’s randomized evaluation but the incentives in this
evaluation are carefully designed to prevent some of the widely known ways of
gaming the incentive systems. One group of teachers in 100 schools across 5
districts in Andhra Pradesh were paid Rs.500/- for every percentage point of
mean improvement in test scores of their students. The other group of teachers
in 100 schools (control group) didn’t receive any incentives and worked in the
status quo conditions. The study[i]
finds that
(i) ‘students who completed
their full five years of primary school under the program performed
significantly better than those in control schools by 0.54 and 0.35 standard
deviations in math and language tests respectively. These students also scored
0.52 and 0.3 standard deviations higher in science and social studies tests
even though there were no incentives on these subjects’.
(ii) “test score gains
represent genuine additions to human capital as opposed to reflecting only
‘teaching to the test’. Students in individual teacher incentive schools score
significantly better on both non-repeat as well as repeat questions; on both
multiple-choice and free-response questions; and on questions designed to test
conceptual understanding as well as questions that could be answered through
rote learning.’”
(iii) “We measure changes in
teacher behavior and the results suggest that the main mechanism for the
improved outcomes in incentive schools is not reduced teacher absence, but
increased teaching activity conditional on presence. We also measure
household responses to the program – for the cohort that was exposed to five
years of the program, at the end of five years – and find that there is no
significant difference across treatment and control groups in either household spending
on education or on time spent studying at home, suggesting that the estimated
effects are unlikely to be confounded by differential household responses
across treatment and control groups over time.”
3. Group incentives: It is
argued that individual incentives might not be fair because a students’
development is a combined effort of all teachers in the school and that the
factors at school level should also be considered. For this purpose, instead of
paying each individual as per their own performance, all teachers in the school
are paid as per the performance of the school. There are reports from other
countries that some schools are recently considering shifting to ‘school based’
incentive model as opposed to ‘individual based incentive model’.
The large scale study in AP
discussed above also evaluates this aspect of incentives. It finds that while
group incentives were as effective as individual incentives in the first year
of the study, at the end of five years, the difference wasn’t significant
though it was positive.
4. Pay upfront but return on
failing to achieve targets: In this structure of incentives, certain amount
of money is paid upfront to the teachers at the beginning of the school year
with an agreement that, they have to return some or all of it at the end of the
year, based on their performance. The idea is that, the prospect of losing
money propels individuals more than the prospects of gaining money, a
phenomenon called as loss aversion.
A study[ii]
conducted in Chicago by Roland Fryer, Steven Levitt, John List and Sally Sadoff
finds that it increases math scores between 0.201 and 0.398 standard
deviations, while the incentives designed as per standard structure had smaller
but insignificant effects.
Two key aspects of monetary
incentives: One, the incentives above are paid as per the improvement of
students of the same teacher, and not as per ranking of students in a particular
exam. Two, incentive systems are different from accountability systems. Incentive
systems pay extra money conditional on performance, while accountability
systems may both incentivize and also penalize teachers based on performance of
student, the penalties ranging from salary cuts to termination of service. The
section above only deals with incentives conditional on performance and not
punitive actions.
In summary, monetary incentives can be an effective way of improving teacher performance. The design of these incentives is crucial; it must take the possible perverse incentives into account to prevent gaming of the system, and must be iterated continuously depending on the feedback and response of the system.
Concerns and challenges of
monetary incentives:
1. Teaching to the test – It
is argued that incentivizing teachers for the performance of students on
specific assessments makes teachers to narrow down the teaching to only those
concepts relevant for the assessments.
One way to address this problem
is to design the assessments appropriately so that they test the desired skills
of students, so that even if one focuses only on the assessment, they will
still be able to acquire the desired skills.
In governance theme, we discussed
that the approach to reform depends on the state of the system, transition from
poor to good systems and good to best systems. If the employees in an
organization aren’t working, not attending the office regularly, then by just
imposing strict rules on attendance and monitoring inputs like work hours
clocked etc., might show at least show outcomes initially, merely because of
the fact that they are at least now putting some efforts. This approach might
not work for reforming systems which are already good but trying to become the
best. One must see the ‘teaching to the test’ in this context. In contexts like
India, where lack of efforts is one of the constraints, then by merely getting
teachers to put some efforts can result in some gains initially. The Andhra Pradesh study corroborates this.
The argument that monetary
incentives for performance of students will narrow down the teaching isn’t
appropriate in systems of weak capacity because, even if aims to achieve
broader outcomes, effort is a necessary condition. Due to the lack of this
effort, currently students aren’t learning much. The increase in efforts due to
these incentives will at least result in some outcomes, something better than
the current situation. It is true that this shouldn’t be seen as the only
approach to incentivize teachers and the incentive structures must adapt as the
system progress to ‘good state’ and while attempting to transform to ‘best’.
2. Difficulty in measuring
test gains attributable to teacher – One, it is argued that the test gains
can’t be solely attributed to teacher and the other socio-economic factors are
also responsible. This can be true but when student performance is measured
against their own baseline, this shouldn’t be an issue.
Two, all teachers don’t have
students of same ability. It may happen that some teachers get students of high
ability and hence showing improvements of their test scores is much difficult
as compared to improving students with low test scores (increasing from 30 to
40 is easier compared to increasing from 90 to 100). This is a genuine concern
and even in the large scale study in AP, researchers had to adjust for this
after first two years, calculating targeted scores for each child and measuring
against the percent achieved. When such systems are implemented in large scale,
concerns like these may result in political resistance, especially if there is
no stake holder buy in. Such changes in formula can be troublesome politically.
However, one should note that in the AP study, “85% of teachers reporting a
favorable opinion about the idea and 68% mentioning that the government should
try to scale up programs of the sort implemented under this project.”
3. Structure and design
of incentives matter – Paying salary over the base pay, giving money
upfront as opposed to giving it at the end of the year, and individual vs.
group based incentives are broad categories of design but even the micro
details of such incentives matter. At times, they can make or break the system.
a) Amount of incentive: ‘Stakes’
often determine people’s response to incentives. Amount of money in this
context decides the stakes and the response of people and the extent to which
they can go to game the system depends on this. Giving Rs.10,000/- per
percentage gain in scores is different from giving Rs.1,000/- per percentage
gain.
b) Threshold effects: If
the incentive is based on achieving certain threshold and is not paid for every
percentage improvement, then it is possible that teachers might just focus on
the good performing students to boost the average score or they may prevent the
low performing students from taking the test.
c) Feasibility to achieve the
incentive: The metrics of the incentive system should be such that they are
perceived as achievable by the teachers. If they are designed to make it
difficult to achieve, then teachers may end up putting efforts because they
wouldn’t be getting incentive anyways. This might even become a justification
for not putting efforts. This is important especially in cases where the
incentives are designed based on loss aversion principle.
If money is given upfront to
teachers, and the incentive metrics are perceived as unachievable by teachers,
and if teachers have to end up paying the money back, then teachers might view returning
money as paying fine for not working, and can justify their actions.
4. Credibility of assessments -
At the end of the day, teachers should perceive these assessments as
credible, and are measuring the true abilities of the child. Design of these
assessments is going to be crucial and the government has to invest on this.
5. Administrative issues - There
are definitely administrative issues with conducting assessments like transferring
question papers, preventing cheating in examination and other issues which are
common to most other policies as well.
6. Monetizing non-monetary
preferences[iii]
- It is argued that there are certain aspects in life which resist
monetization, pure friendship for example. Teaching is also one such act, where
the passion to teach students is one of the important factors. Monetizing such
preferences may not be effective.
It may be true that some people teach
out of passion but it shouldn’t mean that they shouldn’t be paid for that.
Money is a necessary condition but might not a sufficient condition. It is
understandable that one should rekindle the passion to teach in teachers but
monetary incentives and this approach can be complementary, and need not be
perceived as a zero-sum game.
7. Monetary incentives aren’t
sustainable in long term: It is argued that monetary incentives aren’t
sustainable in long term as teachers may find it initially motivating but this
may fade out with time. Though the evidence of AP’s study suggests that it
needn’t be the case, it can be a concern. Hence, these incentives should be
adapted to changing circumstances and be revised.
8. Are teachers in elite
private schools getting performance pays? : Some argue that teachers in
elite private schools work without performance pays and are performing better.
Thus, strict monitoring and accountability is the solution and not incentives.
One must note that these contexts are different; monitoring and incentives
needn’t be seen as zero sum issues, both can be done.
9. Will such initiatives work in government setup? Some of the studies demonstrating positive effects of monetary incentives are cases where an NGO provided these incentives. Incentives in AP study discussed above were also given by an NGO. It is not known if same effects persist if it is implemented through government machinery. For example, a policy in Kenya empowered head masters to give out bonuses to teachers based on their attendance. The amount was up to 85% of the teacher salary and the unspent amount would go into other accounts of the school. The evaluation results suggest that head masters ended up paying uniform bonuses to everyone, despite their absence. This underscores the need for both the design of the incentive programmes and credible independent assessments.
9. Will such initiatives work in government setup? Some of the studies demonstrating positive effects of monetary incentives are cases where an NGO provided these incentives. Incentives in AP study discussed above were also given by an NGO. It is not known if same effects persist if it is implemented through government machinery. For example, a policy in Kenya empowered head masters to give out bonuses to teachers based on their attendance. The amount was up to 85% of the teacher salary and the unspent amount would go into other accounts of the school. The evaluation results suggest that head masters ended up paying uniform bonuses to everyone, despite their absence. This underscores the need for both the design of the incentive programmes and credible independent assessments.
In summary, monetary incentives
can be cost effective way of improving teacher performance. The design of these
incentives is crucial; it must take the various possibilities of gaming the
system and design the incentives accordingly, and must be iterated continuously
depending on the feedback and response of the system.
II. Non-monetary methods to
motivate teachers
We have discussed the problems of
public school teachers in the previous section. Addressing these issues can be
one of the best ways to motivate and incentivize teachers. It is true that some
of these issues may have been exaggerated but it is the way they are being
perceived and some of them can be genuine issues. At least these genuine issues
should be addressed. If these issues aren’t addressed or at least the efforts
aren’t made, then these can become good alibis for non-performance.
As discussed earlier, these
issues can be broadly categorized into infrastructural, lack of appropriate
support and training, lack of recognition, lack of autonomy, unfair systems and
overburdening due to extra academic tasks. The infrastructural issues like lack
of enough teachers, toilets, textbooks etc., need to be addressed to ensure
conducive atmosphere for teachers to work. We already discussed the aspect of teacher
training and support in detail. We discuss the issues of recognition, unfair
systems and lack of autonomy here.
Recognition - The previous
section quoted instances where teachers desired more inspections I craving for
praise and recognition. One of the important steps should be to address this
and rekindle the spirit of motivation in teachers.
One, while best teacher awards
are regularly given to teachers, these are either perceived to be politicized
or unachievable. It is also not possible to recognize efforts of individual
innovations in classrooms with single award. Thus, a community of local teachers
where these are shared and appreciated can be created.
Two, teachers who guide students
to do extra-curricular tasks like participating in inter-school competitions
etc., can be given extra points. These points can be used while preparing the
ranking list during the teacher transfers. Andhra Pradesh state currently does
this.
Three, increase levels of
hierarchy in public teacher service. The unique feature of public teacher
service is that there are only two to three promotions possible in a career of
30-35 years. A primary school teacher can become a teacher in high school and
then the head of a high school. Some with higher degrees go onto become
lecturers or go to other administrative posts but they are very few in number.
A promotion once in 10 years is surely not an encouraging aspect. One can
create more levels of hierarchy, not necessarily varying much in the pay scale
but at least the fact that one is progressing above can act as a booster. Of
course, this alone is not a panacea but it can be one of the solutions.
Unfair systems - Teacher
transfers in some states are highly politicized. Most teachers prefer to get
postings in urban areas as it is convenient to travel and for other evident
reasons. This makes the urban postings highly pricey and these are often
awarded directly to teachers based on orders from minister. This can be highly
demotivating to teachers who end up working in interior areas. Hence, it is
essential to build credible transfer mechanisms for teachers.
Lack of autonomy – Teachers
in Mooij’s study reported lack of autonomy as one of their concerns. In some
cases, it is true to an extent. Some teachers feel highly constrained by the
fact that they have to deal with infrastructural issues in schools like lack of
teachers, unmotivated parents and also that they don’t have much elbow space to
move around. Even simple requests sent by schools take long time to get
approvals and often seemingly small issues like school timings can be troublesome.
For example, in some states the starting time and closing time of schools are
fixed. In some villages, the first bus to the village reaches after the
starting time of the school and sometimes the last bus from the village leaves
before the school ends. It is a daily hassle for teachers to deal with these
issues. Even if one doesn’t want to break the rules, such situations bring in unnecessary
ethical conundrums. In cases like this, schools can be given autonomy to decide
starting and ending times, if needed keeping the duration of school fixed.
Other than this, schools can be given autonomy so that the teachers feel that
they are genuinely empowered and have the resources to bring change, if they
desire to.
[i] Long-Term
Effects of Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India – Karthik Muralidharan
[ii] Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher
Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment - Roland G. Fryer, Steven D. Levitt, John List,
Sally Sadoff
[iii] Phrase
taken from the book Tort Theory by Kenneth D. Cooper-Stephenson, Elaine
Gibson (page 139)
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